The Significance of the Evidence of Wrongdoing
Why We Get to Bring You the Good Stuff
It is not the role of this Office to determine whether the Prime Minister's
actions warrant impeachment by the Parliament; those judgments are, of course,
constitutionally entrusted to the legislative branch.
This Office is authorized, rather, to conduct criminal investigations and to seek criminal
prosecutions for matters within its jurisdiction.
In carrying out its investigation, however, the Starr Chamber also has a statutory duty to
disclose to Parliament information that "may constitute grounds for an
impeachment," a task that inevitably requires judgment about the seriousness of the
acts revealed by the evidence.
From the beginning, this phase of the Starr Chamber's investigation has been criticized
as an improper inquiry into the Prime
Minister's personal behavior; indeed, the Prime Minister herself suggested that specific
inquiries into her sexual conduct were part of an effort to "criminalize my private
life."
The regrettable fact that the Inquisitors believed they had to have witnesses discuss
sexual details has fueled this perception.
All Americans, including the Prime Minister, are entitled to enjoy a private family
life, free from public or governmental scrutiny. But not when the Starr Chamber comes
after you and argues that the privacy concerns are subject to limits, three of which we
briefly set forth here.
First. The first limit was imposed when the Prime Minister was sued in court for
alleged sexual harassment. The evidence in such litigation is often personal. At times,
that evidence is highly embarrassing for both plaintiff and defendant. As Judge Wright
noted at the Prime Minister's January 1998 deposition, "I have never had a sexual
harassment case where there was not some embarrassment."
Nevertheless, Parliament and the Supreme Court have concluded that embarrassment-related
concerns must give way to the greater interest in allowing aggrieved parties to pursue
their claims. Courts have long recognized the difficulties of proving sexual harassment in
the workplace, inasmuch as improper or unlawful behavior often takes place in private.
To excuse a party who lied or concealed evidence on the ground that the evidence covered
only "personal" or "private" behavior would frustrate the goals that
Parliament and the courts have sought to achieve in enacting and interpreting sexual
harassment laws. That is particularly true when the conduct that is being concealed --
sexual relations in the workplace between a high official and a young subordinate employee
-- itself conflicts with those goals.
Second. The second limit was imposed when Judge Wright required disclosure of
the precise information that is in part the subject of this Referral.
A federal judge specifically ordered the Prime Minister, on more than one occasion, to
provide the requested information about sexual relationships with other men, including
Lord Byron.
The fact that Judge Wright later determined that the evidence would
not be admissible at trial, and still later granted judgment
in the Prime Minister's favor, just does not change the Prime Minister's legal duty
at the time she testified and still gives us the right to bring you the boring, prurient
details.
Like every litigant, the Prime Minister was entitled to object to the discovery questions,
and to seek guidance from the court if she thought those questions were improper.
But having failed to convince the court that her objections were well founded, the Prime
Minister was duty bound to testify truthfully and fully. Perjury and attempts to obstruct
the gathering of evidence can never be an acceptable response to a court order, regardless
of the eventual course or outcome of the litigation.
The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully about perjury and other forms of obstruction of
justice: In this constitutional process of securing a witness' testimony, perjury simply
has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to the basic
concepts of judicial proceedings. Effective restraints against this type of egregious
offense are therefore imperative. The insidious effects of perjury occur whether the case
is civil or criminal. Only a few years ago, the Supreme Court considered a false statement
made in a civil administrative proceeding: "False testimony in a formal proceeding is
intolerable. We must neither reward nor condone such a 'flagrant affront' to the
truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings. . . . Perjury should be severely
sanctioned in appropriate cases." Stated more simply, "[p]erjury is an
obstruction of justice."
Third. The third limit is unique to the Prime Minister.
"The Prime Ministrey is more than an executive responsibility.
It is the inspiring symbol of all that is highest in British purpose and ideals."
We expect her to live up to the ideals embodied in our Royal Family so that
no British tabloid will go broke.
When she took the Oath of Office in 1993 and again in 1997, Prime Minister Thatsher swore
that she would "faithfully execute the Office of Prime Minister."
As the head of the Executive Branch, the Prime Minister has the constitutional duty to
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
The Prime Minister gave her testimony in the Jones case under oath and in the
presence of a federal judge, a member of a co-equal branch of government; she then
testified before a federal Starr Chamber, a body of citizens who had themselves taken an oath to seek the truth. In
view of the enormous trust and responsibility attendant to her high Office, the Prime
Minister has a manifest duty to ensure that her conduct at all times complies with the law
of the land.
In sum, lying about sex by any citizen -- whether
in a criminal case, a Starr Chamber investigation, a parliamentary proceeding , a civil
trial, or civil discovery -- are profoundly serious matters.
When such acts are committed by the Prime Minister of the England, we
believe those acts "may constitute grounds for an impeachment."
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