HYDE: I thank the gentleman, his time is up. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.

SCOTT: Mr. Chairman, I have to first note that the witness today -- Mr. Chairman, I first have to note that the witness today is the prosecutor in the case.

Most prosecutors begin their presentations in court with an admonition that what they say and what defense counsel says is not evidence. Evidence will be heard from witnesses.

As Mr. Conyers has said in his opening remarks, many of us have questions involving prosecutorial misconduct, illegal leaks, conflicts of interest -- questions which are relevant to our oversight responsibility of the Justice Department and independent counsel, but irrelevant to the question of shall the president be impeached, which is the issue of today's hearing.

So I hope we don't have to discuss the unfairness and absurdity of basing an impeachment of the president of the United States on a presentation from the prosecutor and a review of written statements, many of which were not under oath, and none of which were subject to cross examination.

So fairness has always been an issue. Mr. Chairman, I do want to thank you and Mr. Canady for finally convening a hearing on the history and background of impeachment, so at least we now have a framework in which to review the allegations before us. That hearing was necessary because we heard from 400 historians and received a letter from 400 constitutional authorities; another letter from 200 constitutional law professors, which warned us that not one of Mr. Starr's allegations constituted an impeachable offense.

We heard discussion today about the rule of law. At the hearing, we heard that the Constitution restricts our legal authority to impeach the president to those offense which constitute treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. At the hearing, we dealt with issues such as the historic difference between impeachment of judges and impeachment of presidents.

We addressed the question of when perjury can constitute an impeachable offense and when it should not constitute an impeachable offense. And we worked to evaluate a standard for impeachment and specifically considered the -- whether commission of a crime which would violate the presidential oath to faithfully execute the laws -- whether that could be an appropriate measure.

At our hearing, we -- the entire first panel of witnesses, including the majority of which were invited by the Republicans, agreed with the phrase -- agreed that the phrase "treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors" does not cover all felonies. And that is, that the Constitution does not give Congress the authority to remove a sitting president based on the standard that he committed a crime, and therefore failed to faithfully execute the laws.

Remember, as my colleague from Virginia said, that the president will be subject to criminal prosecution after he leaves office. But they all agreed that we do not have the legal authority to remove the president based on Mr. Starr's suggestion that he failed to faithfully execute the laws.

And so the rule of law restrains our impeachment authority to consideration of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors, and that therefore at the hearing, both Democrats and even many Republican witnesses, raised serious questions about our constitutional authority to use any or all of the charges as a basis for presidential impeachment.

Mr. Van Alstyne, a Republican witness, described the allegations as low crimes and misdemeanors, and further said that the impeachment pursuit of Mr. Clinton may well not be particularly worthwhile. When I asked the entire second panel about the Starr referral count 11(a), executive privilege, the clear consensus on the panel was that the executive privilege charge was not an impeachable offense.

For example, Mr. Cooper, a Republican witness said that I do not think that invoking executive privilege, even frivolously, and I believe it was frivolous in this circumstance, but I do not believe that constitutes an impeachable offense.

And so some of the -- some said that none were impeachable offenses, but there was a clear consensus that at least some of the allegations are too flimsy to pursue. This sentiment was reflected in majority counsel's presentation last month, which left out some of the allegations. Mr. Chairman's public suggestion that we should focus on two or three allegations, and several Republican members of this committee ...

HYDE: The gentleman's time has expired.
SCOTT: Could I have about 40 additional seconds, Mr. Chairman?
HYDE: Thirty seconds, without objection.

SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several Republican members of this committee, who have publicly raised questions about some of the allegations.

Because of the confusion over which allegations are actually worth pursuing, it is absurd to participate in fact finding when some allegations may well be dropped even if they're determined to be true.

That's why I joined ranking member Mr. Conyers in a letter requesting that we call an end to the confusion and determine which, if any, of the allegations before us, even if true, might constitute an impeachable offense.

Unfortunately, that request was denied, and now we have the situation in which we have an open-ended, never-ending committee in search of high crimes, and participating in the spectacle of having the prosecutor serve as our witness.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

HYDE: The -- did -- are you awaiting an answer, or are you -- was that rhetorical? It was rhetorical?

SCOTT: It was rhetorical.

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